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PROPOSED APPROACH TO | TASK FORCE AGENDA
ic Premise
The basic premise of this vropoctc? cn oroeech to an aserda is the following
-roposition: There is widesnread dissatisfaction with the present svecific-—vcrorrom
——— - a eee ee
nnnronch of the federal covernnont to urb2n rroblems; therefore our task shonld he
to rosnond to this Cissatisfictiy 277 in the most meaningful
possible ways. Such @iscsatisfectin: i° emer one of the main conclusions
which emerred from the Ribicoff hesrings, and it also is the theme of Paul Ylvisczker'
eorlier "arends vaner." Both thers cocuments called for an as—yet—unfornnlates
"netr anproach" to vrban oroblem-. W“owever, seeking a new anproach is not the oniy
nosrible or relevan snonse to smpmggmet Cicssatisfaction with the effectivenecc
existine 27>7ronches. n foct, thefe are four possible responses, all of which
have some merit.
II. Tosrible Renvonses to the Basic Premise
Thene four reanonses ean be put in the form of the followine cuestions, here st-t77
with come tentative idens about bow they micht be answered:
1. Is it really true that current vroerams are ineffective? Although
it is certainly truce that c»rrent faderal prosrams have not "tnrnec srouns"
| single oo |
the mador trends in o+yeeppime city, they may; be quite effective in relstion
to the efforts nut into them. However, we really co not know
they are because we do not have any ways to measure program effectivevesc
in SM urban areas very accurately. Therefore, this resnonse surce>
that the Trek Force explore the followine issnves:
iat What mechanions for effective program evaluation can be created
=
sustained at both local and federal levels? What alternative a7”
to vroser-m evaluation are vossible,
mobilized to effectuate each?
ee ---—‘ow com futvure decicion—-making be as sea so that more alternative
vrogrem possibilities will be looked at, locally and federally?
Is the ineffectiveness of current programs possibly caused by their
inadequate scale rather thon innynropriate design —— hence would they
become much more effective if croatly expanded in magnitude? When the
eorly government snendine ~rorrams advanced by Franklin Roosevelt's
ers cdministration to cure the Grest Depression Pignled out in the
downturn of 1937, many critics .blamed the poor design of these programs
condemnec the entire ider of Federal spending as an aid to nrosnerity.
then when governmont enencine really became enormous in the war effort
of the early Ses 1940's, wnemmloyment and recession vanished 21most
instantly, and the economy expenced wivilian outnut at the same time that
it vroduced hure amounts of military goodse To most economists, this
exnerience dramatically proved that government snending indeed can banish
unemnloyment and recession if undertaken on a large enough scale to be
effective, Similarly, it can verhnps be argued that urban renewal and
~nublic housins have feiled to ==ummmm& “solve the low-income hovsine rroblem"
mainly because they have been urrertaken in such tiny amounts. Hven the
desion flows in these nrorr.2ms (such as creating massive concentretions of
broken families in nublic honsing develomments) might be radically alterec
if the vrorrsms were exparded in sesale by a factor of, say, 10 to 20, since
2 ereatly exnandecd clientele would have to be served.
It seems crucial for the Task Force to answer this question for the
following reasons:
a, Insofar as inadequate scale alone is resnonsible for any aneffectivenes
of current vrograms, it might be a gross social policy error to shift
emphasis to looking for some non-existent "new aonroach" when the real
vastly
need wae for more of the old anvroaches.
fara And! Kor Congress ,
There is a tendency for various federal agencies to look for some
A A
relotively inexpensive "cure" for urban shetto vroblems. If this
tendency is inherently bound to fail because all "cures" are extremely
5
costly, the President should be anprised of this fact so he will not
delude himself considering "chean cures," and so he can begin influencifig
public opinion to recent the costliness of adecuate measures.
Pursuing this resvonse to the basic vremise would cause the Task Force
to investigate the actuol vast marnitude of each major federal urban program
4 tr
(as measured in total and annual expenditures over, say, the past 30 years)
measure of the
a¢2inst some sli univerre in which that program must operate. Far examvle,
“A
total public houvsine ernenditures —- and results in terms of units built —-
5
might be compared to total U.S. exnenditures on housins cons truction, oné
units built in the U.
beet gene Senarate chleuvlations might be made in sub-areas (such
as Nex oie where the relrtive scale might be much higher than the national
averare, just to test what might hapnen if the national effort were raiéger,.
Similar quantifications could be made for health programs, welfare vrocrans,
urban renewal, anti-delincuency vrograms, etc. Results micht be similar
to those already mode in agriculture, where it can be shown that over 40%
of all form income in the 1.5. comes directly from federal payments.
What ste some nossible alternatives to the current vrogrammatic a roach?
Diseatisfrction with whet we heave does not necescarily vrove there are
better ways to do thines; verhaps the truth is merely that "life is tough."
Yet the followin alternotives might be fruitfully investigater by the
nr. Crentine stroncer incentives for private effort and_investment in
producing solutions to urban shetto problems. Svecifically, the
follovine tyves of incentives might be, investigated:
‘ wflaluts sg: akicank/ by having
hi pees O eita voccible siimagmme the federrl rovernment create
* significant market for some service relevant to the chetto, svch
og rehabilitater honsines, jobs for unskilled and vroblem wor'cers¢
(created by narine employers premiums to hire ond use them), new
housing, and ecucational vororrams,
4
2) Removine existine incentives to “act badly" in chetto 2renac, such
as low assessment for slum property, high depreciation allowances, =
any denrecittion cllowance at all for property not in full complianc
to codes, countinz srch non-compliance property as an-asset for
financial institutions, 2a and higher property assessments for
rehabilitated ~roverty,
2) Reruction of red-tane and remilation through such programs as the
"turn-key" aprroach to sublic housing.
A) Creation of nermissive incentives through allowing.tax eretits for
investments in chettos or certain kinds of job training.
Shiftine the locus of em crocrem formulation or the allocation of
resources to urhan nroblens avay from the federal covernment to sone
other syot. The following methods of redistributing income collected
by the federal covernment would be means of accomolishing this:
1) Givine block grants to states.
2) Givine block crantr to central citier.
2) Crentine 2 miorcntesd onnunl income for at least those nernons
now on welfnre of socirl security who cannot be empectec to work.
A) Givinze block sront+-to metropolitan areas that create aren-ride
rovearnments to vse them.
5S) GCombinine »resent federal erants into broader "comorchenctve
-ropram erants."
-The Task Force mirht investigate 211 of these devices in orver to
anciver the following cuestions about erch one:
---What "strings" should be attached to such income transfers? What
oe pak uo) “Oy 4 nets
institution. l chonre should be aimed at “ach “nurchacec of
A
A
imrovotion"?
What se ,
FRI
mms
troule be necessary to versurde the institutions
involved to make the Aecinog chang es?
--—What would the recinients be likely to do with the money?
-~——Yow larre 2 multixlier effect would such money have? 1!
:
aiffer$ from ite offeetc if retained by the federal rovernment?
—---What is the net cesirobility of this device?
Since the Model Cities “roreram can be viewed as a device for shifting
al. £ = * - 7 5
some control over »srorrens to ldcal rovernments, it might be evaluates
under this headine too.
desirabl
1t/changes or additions to current prosrams can be relatively easily
identified to make them more effective? In svite of the seeminzly
widespread feeling that "moreinal tinkering" with vresent provrams wi
valuable
not nroduce any significont imnrovements in cities, some/chanres or new
orocram noecibilities micht be sume relatively ensily identified. Exomnle:
micht be
a2, Creotine 2 FUD Ascistert Secretary for Research with a sienifi
-o
rerearch budvet, =5 recommended carlier.
site mnblic housins Hage rentine evicting cvwelliner
to fisenerse Verro am low-income families to all parts of exch
netronoliten "PO, eanecinlly neprer job onrortunitiec.
ce Chanrine FA vroceturec in a variety of mecific ways, inclvding
‘
renarction of "norudent investor" activity from "social-uncervritor"
netivitry.
a. FPollowine the recommendations about neighborhood centers and subsidizer
hone ownershiv made errlier.
Thus, from there four rennonses to the basic premise, the Tosk Force can formulate
a number of cnecific research projects for investization by the staff ind ovtside
exnerts, Policy conclusions for the final revort can then be based unon there
+ ase
faintints.
TII. Suerested Methods of Procec®
It is sugrested that the Task Force nrroceed on the basis of the following
recommendations and’ actions:
All four of the responses Aoceribe? xbove chould be vursued, rather than
ony one or tro alone,
Subcommittees should be formes to pursue these four resvonses —— nerhoans
one subcommittesc for each rocsnonse, or perhaps with a different division
of lnbor, but keyed to the four-responce format.
Snecifie research cesiennents choulé be defined for 2ll four resvon-es by
the Task Force as a whole incofsr as nossible, and then by subcommittees
meetine senarately,
These research assienments chould be assigned to both staff members and
"outside experts" where the exnertise of the latter isrelevant., Money
should be procvred to nav such exnerts for pavers focussed on their nolicr
views or factunl views, varying from case to case. (The term "both" coer
not. 2741y overlanning nssicmments, but utilization of both tynes of service.)
Tontative reportine Antes for 211 research assienments should be create?
within the nort month, thoveh the d¢ntes may be later than that.
After ronortinge dates ane cssienments are set, a full time-table for the
Task Force choula be created. If necessary, further extension of our
time reriod cthoule be recvnecter.
ic Premise
The basic premise of this vropoctc? cn oroeech to an aserda is the following
-roposition: There is widesnread dissatisfaction with the present svecific-—vcrorrom
——— - a eee ee
nnnronch of the federal covernnont to urb2n rroblems; therefore our task shonld he
to rosnond to this Cissatisfictiy 277 in the most meaningful
possible ways. Such @iscsatisfectin: i° emer one of the main conclusions
which emerred from the Ribicoff hesrings, and it also is the theme of Paul Ylvisczker'
eorlier "arends vaner." Both thers cocuments called for an as—yet—unfornnlates
"netr anproach" to vrban oroblem-. W“owever, seeking a new anproach is not the oniy
nosrible or relevan snonse to smpmggmet Cicssatisfaction with the effectivenecc
existine 27>7ronches. n foct, thefe are four possible responses, all of which
have some merit.
II. Tosrible Renvonses to the Basic Premise
Thene four reanonses ean be put in the form of the followine cuestions, here st-t77
with come tentative idens about bow they micht be answered:
1. Is it really true that current vroerams are ineffective? Although
it is certainly truce that c»rrent faderal prosrams have not "tnrnec srouns"
| single oo |
the mador trends in o+yeeppime city, they may; be quite effective in relstion
to the efforts nut into them. However, we really co not know
they are because we do not have any ways to measure program effectivevesc
in SM urban areas very accurately. Therefore, this resnonse surce>
that the Trek Force explore the followine issnves:
iat What mechanions for effective program evaluation can be created
=
sustained at both local and federal levels? What alternative a7”
to vroser-m evaluation are vossible,
mobilized to effectuate each?
ee ---—‘ow com futvure decicion—-making be as sea so that more alternative
vrogrem possibilities will be looked at, locally and federally?
Is the ineffectiveness of current programs possibly caused by their
inadequate scale rather thon innynropriate design —— hence would they
become much more effective if croatly expanded in magnitude? When the
eorly government snendine ~rorrams advanced by Franklin Roosevelt's
ers cdministration to cure the Grest Depression Pignled out in the
downturn of 1937, many critics .blamed the poor design of these programs
condemnec the entire ider of Federal spending as an aid to nrosnerity.
then when governmont enencine really became enormous in the war effort
of the early Ses 1940's, wnemmloyment and recession vanished 21most
instantly, and the economy expenced wivilian outnut at the same time that
it vroduced hure amounts of military goodse To most economists, this
exnerience dramatically proved that government snending indeed can banish
unemnloyment and recession if undertaken on a large enough scale to be
effective, Similarly, it can verhnps be argued that urban renewal and
~nublic housins have feiled to ==ummmm& “solve the low-income hovsine rroblem"
mainly because they have been urrertaken in such tiny amounts. Hven the
desion flows in these nrorr.2ms (such as creating massive concentretions of
broken families in nublic honsing develomments) might be radically alterec
if the vrorrsms were exparded in sesale by a factor of, say, 10 to 20, since
2 ereatly exnandecd clientele would have to be served.
It seems crucial for the Task Force to answer this question for the
following reasons:
a, Insofar as inadequate scale alone is resnonsible for any aneffectivenes
of current vrograms, it might be a gross social policy error to shift
emphasis to looking for some non-existent "new aonroach" when the real
vastly
need wae for more of the old anvroaches.
fara And! Kor Congress ,
There is a tendency for various federal agencies to look for some
A A
relotively inexpensive "cure" for urban shetto vroblems. If this
tendency is inherently bound to fail because all "cures" are extremely
5
costly, the President should be anprised of this fact so he will not
delude himself considering "chean cures," and so he can begin influencifig
public opinion to recent the costliness of adecuate measures.
Pursuing this resvonse to the basic vremise would cause the Task Force
to investigate the actuol vast marnitude of each major federal urban program
4 tr
(as measured in total and annual expenditures over, say, the past 30 years)
measure of the
a¢2inst some sli univerre in which that program must operate. Far examvle,
“A
total public houvsine ernenditures —- and results in terms of units built —-
5
might be compared to total U.S. exnenditures on housins cons truction, oné
units built in the U.
beet gene Senarate chleuvlations might be made in sub-areas (such
as Nex oie where the relrtive scale might be much higher than the national
averare, just to test what might hapnen if the national effort were raiéger,.
Similar quantifications could be made for health programs, welfare vrocrans,
urban renewal, anti-delincuency vrograms, etc. Results micht be similar
to those already mode in agriculture, where it can be shown that over 40%
of all form income in the 1.5. comes directly from federal payments.
What ste some nossible alternatives to the current vrogrammatic a roach?
Diseatisfrction with whet we heave does not necescarily vrove there are
better ways to do thines; verhaps the truth is merely that "life is tough."
Yet the followin alternotives might be fruitfully investigater by the
nr. Crentine stroncer incentives for private effort and_investment in
producing solutions to urban shetto problems. Svecifically, the
follovine tyves of incentives might be, investigated:
‘ wflaluts sg: akicank/ by having
hi pees O eita voccible siimagmme the federrl rovernment create
* significant market for some service relevant to the chetto, svch
og rehabilitater honsines, jobs for unskilled and vroblem wor'cers¢
(created by narine employers premiums to hire ond use them), new
housing, and ecucational vororrams,
4
2) Removine existine incentives to “act badly" in chetto 2renac, such
as low assessment for slum property, high depreciation allowances, =
any denrecittion cllowance at all for property not in full complianc
to codes, countinz srch non-compliance property as an-asset for
financial institutions, 2a and higher property assessments for
rehabilitated ~roverty,
2) Reruction of red-tane and remilation through such programs as the
"turn-key" aprroach to sublic housing.
A) Creation of nermissive incentives through allowing.tax eretits for
investments in chettos or certain kinds of job training.
Shiftine the locus of em crocrem formulation or the allocation of
resources to urhan nroblens avay from the federal covernment to sone
other syot. The following methods of redistributing income collected
by the federal covernment would be means of accomolishing this:
1) Givine block grants to states.
2) Givine block crantr to central citier.
2) Crentine 2 miorcntesd onnunl income for at least those nernons
now on welfnre of socirl security who cannot be empectec to work.
A) Givinze block sront+-to metropolitan areas that create aren-ride
rovearnments to vse them.
5S) GCombinine »resent federal erants into broader "comorchenctve
-ropram erants."
-The Task Force mirht investigate 211 of these devices in orver to
anciver the following cuestions about erch one:
---What "strings" should be attached to such income transfers? What
oe pak uo) “Oy 4 nets
institution. l chonre should be aimed at “ach “nurchacec of
A
A
imrovotion"?
What se ,
FRI
mms
troule be necessary to versurde the institutions
involved to make the Aecinog chang es?
--—What would the recinients be likely to do with the money?
-~——Yow larre 2 multixlier effect would such money have? 1!
:
aiffer$ from ite offeetc if retained by the federal rovernment?
—---What is the net cesirobility of this device?
Since the Model Cities “roreram can be viewed as a device for shifting
al. £ = * - 7 5
some control over »srorrens to ldcal rovernments, it might be evaluates
under this headine too.
desirabl
1t/changes or additions to current prosrams can be relatively easily
identified to make them more effective? In svite of the seeminzly
widespread feeling that "moreinal tinkering" with vresent provrams wi
valuable
not nroduce any significont imnrovements in cities, some/chanres or new
orocram noecibilities micht be sume relatively ensily identified. Exomnle:
micht be
a2, Creotine 2 FUD Ascistert Secretary for Research with a sienifi
-o
rerearch budvet, =5 recommended carlier.
site mnblic housins Hage rentine evicting cvwelliner
to fisenerse Verro am low-income families to all parts of exch
netronoliten "PO, eanecinlly neprer job onrortunitiec.
ce Chanrine FA vroceturec in a variety of mecific ways, inclvding
‘
renarction of "norudent investor" activity from "social-uncervritor"
netivitry.
a. FPollowine the recommendations about neighborhood centers and subsidizer
hone ownershiv made errlier.
Thus, from there four rennonses to the basic premise, the Tosk Force can formulate
a number of cnecific research projects for investization by the staff ind ovtside
exnerts, Policy conclusions for the final revort can then be based unon there
+ ase
faintints.
TII. Suerested Methods of Procec®
It is sugrested that the Task Force nrroceed on the basis of the following
recommendations and’ actions:
All four of the responses Aoceribe? xbove chould be vursued, rather than
ony one or tro alone,
Subcommittees should be formes to pursue these four resvonses —— nerhoans
one subcommittesc for each rocsnonse, or perhaps with a different division
of lnbor, but keyed to the four-responce format.
Snecifie research cesiennents choulé be defined for 2ll four resvon-es by
the Task Force as a whole incofsr as nossible, and then by subcommittees
meetine senarately,
These research assienments chould be assigned to both staff members and
"outside experts" where the exnertise of the latter isrelevant., Money
should be procvred to nav such exnerts for pavers focussed on their nolicr
views or factunl views, varying from case to case. (The term "both" coer
not. 2741y overlanning nssicmments, but utilization of both tynes of service.)
Tontative reportine Antes for 211 research assienments should be create?
within the nort month, thoveh the d¢ntes may be later than that.
After ronortinge dates ane cssienments are set, a full time-table for the
Task Force choula be created. If necessary, further extension of our
time reriod cthoule be recvnecter.