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WASHINGTON POST Novet1ber 26, 1967 Strange Bed/ellows Lobbying for the Nation's Cities B_y Willimn Chapman washin r. lon Poist St.arr Writer T THE HEIGHT of the House bat- A 11<-' o,·pr ;rni1povert.y funds, 11 bord ':.'r i: ne C',,ngres.snwn were visited by tw0 tolibyhl s un a('c ust.amed to linking arm,; in any joinl endeavor. One was the top Washington representative of an automobile manufacturer ; th i> ,ilh!'r speaks to Congress for the Unit ed Automobile Workers. All 11 Con;:!ressmr> n represent districts in wh 1<:h the ml•tor c:ompany is a large, if n ot the largest, e mployer. All have constitue nts in the UAW. Th P talk was not or car sales but of pcn-rrly . In a soft-~e ll ap proach, the visitors asked support for the $2.06 billion au thorization [nr the antipoverty prr,,_!ram and ur).!ecl I.he doubtful Congrf'~E men to resist c [forls to cut it b ark. Tht· unusual co1ifrontat.ions (" It's the fir~t time in my nine years in Wash.ingt.on I've gone into a Congressman's .)rf'1,:c with a UAW man," observes the ind11 , t r,v lnhbyist) ma rked the first sig;11 f1cant dri ve of the Urban Coalition, a f!,·d~li 111; orga niza tion rtevoted to pr .. ss1ng l1·.~1s latil1 n il hopes will solve t IH· C' r i~i~ of the cit ies. In the •a rgot of Washington politics, it is a campaign with great potential "clout" because it is loaded with the names of big business, labor, civil righ ts, religion and city politics. It puts Walter Reuther on the same bandwagon with Henry Ford II, and links moderate civil rights leaders with General Electric, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and the Chase Manhattan Bank. The key is business support, for without it the Urban Coalition is little more than an assemblage of liberals, city hall politicians and civil rights leaders who have lobbied for social welfare legislation for years. One spokesman familiar with the Coalition's founding observed that in such fields as poverty, model cities funds and rent supplemeruts, Congressmen are accustomed "to hearing from civil rights people and labor. But they have rarely, if ever, heard from business." Is business really on the bandwagon? The signs are far from clear. Besides the automobile lobbyist, a few others acknowledge they called or wrote certadn Congressmen, blllt are reluctant to discuss details. Alfred Eisenpreis, vice president of Allied Stores Corp. of New -York, said he talked t-0 "several" Congressmen. about the poverty bill. His list included some whose districts contain Allied stores and others with whom he is acquainted. Had he changed any votes? "I don't know . . . I would have no r eason to say if I knew," Eisenpreis replied . J . Irwin Miller, chairman of tl">e Cummins Engine Co. of Columhus, Ind .. wrote to hi~ Congressman anrt Senators on at least one issue, but has "not been as active as I hope to be." On only one issue besides the antipoverty fundin•g h as the Urban Coalition attempted to exert conrentrated pressure- the emergency j obs legislation that drew a surprising amount of Senate support in the face of stiff Johnson Administration opposition. The best evidence available indica tes that labor provided the most direct lobbying for the employment bill, other than the Senators who sponsored it. One industry leader active in th E' Urban Coalition said his firm did nnt support the emergency jobs program although the Coalition's legislative �C"omrnittee had endorsed it. It was 1eared, he said, that the bill had too little support and might saddle the Coalition with a publicized failure just as it was gettin g started. Also, he said, the Senate bill did not offer as many jobs as the Coalition's platform proposes and therefore might have "falsely raised the hopes of the poor." The Urban Coalition sprang out of meetings sponsored by Urban America, a relatively new Washington organization sµP.c ializing in research and analysis of ur ban problems. It was largely a paper committee until last summer's big-city riots rocked the country. In the aftermath, the Coalition held an "emergency convocation" in Washington, laid out a list of urgent needs and set about organizlng the political framework. The movers in the Coalition were perso ns profoundly discourage d by the national reaction to the .riots. Mayors and civil rights leaders who had pleadt:d for appropriations for model cities rnd rent supplements found Congreu in no mood to spend more money. The ·poverty program appeared destined for a quick trip down the drain. The White House let it be known that no new urban-aid programs would be adva nced this year. Experienced lobbyists .and nose-counters in the United Staites Coil!fereJ1Ce of Mayors had long noted one particularly disappointing fact-the persistent opposition of Congressmen from suburban areas. Their ranks growing with court decisions requiring congressional red istricting, the suburban Congressmen were proving to be nearly as uninterested in central-city programs as th eir rural counterparts. Such complaints aire illustrated by an independent analysis of 1967 vo tes on key urban issues such as model cities, the control of rats, rent supplements and antipoverty funds . There are, at latest count, 56 Congressmen whose districts are predominantly composed of people living in what the Census Bureau describes as th e "urban fring e." On almost every peculiarly urban issue, about half of the suburban Congressmen voted against the Administration's bills or appropriation requests . Twenty-four of them, for example, wanted to eliminate all funds for the fled gling model cities program . Twenty-six joined the majority last Ju ly to kill the rat control bill, later revived. Using a wider ta rget, the Urban Coali tion pinpointed 110 Congressmen fr om districts in 52 metropolitan areas who are consider ed "negative" on ma jor ur ba n legislat ion. Stra,ige Bedfellows Aiding the Cities "There! That should keep you in rhe w:iy to which you're accu,1om ed." "They particularly hurt us on money bills," observed one Coalition spokesman. "They are conservative and they don't like to spend money-even though they might not be opposed to the legislation per se." The Coalition's . strategy ca ll ed for ·approaching th ese targe ts through businessmen who own the shopping centers or manage the suburhan plants of big business. The unstated tactic is to convince t hem they have an interest in a healthy downtown and that they should advise their Congressmen of their feelings. "We have got to convince the shopping center guy that he has a basic interest in urban legislaU-on-if only in seeing that the city is not burned down," said one strategist. "And to be blunt, it is worth pointing out that in Detroit there were fires five miles outside the ghetto." With the legislative season nearly over, the Coalition is now concentrating on founding local counterpartsmetropolitan coalition s tha t incl ude represe ntatives from bu siness, labo r. local government, church and ch·iJ rights groups. The model of local coalitions is tllf' "New Detroit Committee," whi ch wa ~ formed independently of the nationa ! coalition after the riot last surnm ei·. With a leadership rang ing from Re uth er to all three big auto compani es, th P Detroit committee lent some suppor1 to the national fight over pover ty funds ·but has directed mos t lobbyin g efforts at the Michigan Legislature in support of Go v. Geo rge Romney's fair housing bill. In Washington . a local coa lition I i' being form ed with the im pctm com ing from Pa tric k Cardinal O'Boy le or th e Ca tholic Ar chd iocese of Was hingto n a nd the He alth and Welfare Cou ncil of the National Capi tal Area . �